Fixing the Administration’s intelligence woes
‘Twas no surprise that a presidential commission today reported that the administration was ‘dead wrong’ about WMDs in Iraq–after all, plenty of us could see in 2002-03 that the evidence as given was much too flimsy to justify war–but it was a bit disturbing how forcefully the report made the point that our current intelligence capabilities are so messed up that we know ‘disturbingly little’ detail about even our known enemies. (Intelligence problems? Dubya? Urge to make joke…must..resist…) Well, I suppose the first step towards solving a problem is admitting it exists. I especially like the commission’s recommendation to encourage questioning and dissent within the various agencies: as anyone with scientific training knows, knowing the alternate hypothesis and margins of error is as important–often more so!–than knowing what the current ‘best fit’ (or ‘most desirable’) answer is.
Another recommendation I found interesting was to have the new director of intelligence not provide the daily briefings to the President, to have said director focus not on the details of current knowledge but instead on the more general aspect of how the agencies collect and analyze data. Bush is unlikely to go with this, and I think that indicates a flaw in his leadership style. In his MBA-warped mind he believes that much should be delegated to others, who should whittle info down to small chunks that require quick, high-level decisions from among a few clear options. Unfortunately, this mentality is exactly what led to the ‘group-think’ that encouraged analysts to pass along what the neocons wanted to hear. The intelligence director should ensure that the best possible information and analysis is provided, but it should not be his responsibility to assess, edit, and act upon that info–that accountability should lie squarely with the President.
